Introduction
University teachers, boards, committees and other bodies constituted under university regulations make a variety of decisions which affect their students and which may impact significantly upon those students' expectations. Examples include decisions about enrolment, subject choice, assessment, credit for prior learning, research supervision and so on. In making such decisions universities are bound by their processes and procedures and by the rules of natural justice. Inevitably, some decisions will be challenged by the students concerned.
The types of university decisions challenged in the courts by students fit largely into three categories. First, there are decisions which involve academic judgement, for example, the grade to be given to a particular piece of work, whether to pass or fail a student on academic grounds, or whether to exclude a student from a course for insufficient progress. There are then two types of disciplinary decisions. One relates to conduct unconnected with academic achievement, for example, a student's behaviour towards other students or university property. It is not intended to deal here with this type of decision except to note that the courts have made it clear that students in such cases have a right to a fair hearing as there is essentially no difference between disciplinary matters within a university and disciplinary matters within any other public institution or organization.
1 Then there is the second type of disciplinary decision which follows a finding of academic misconduct such as cheating in examinations, plagiarism in written work, or some other form of misconduct which has the effect of bringing the student's research into question.
In deciding whether to intervene, courts initially focussed on the type of university decision being challenged. 2 A review of the early cases indicates the courts were careful to distinguish between 'purely academic' decisions and academic disciplinary decisions. authority suggests the courts now lean more towards a concern with the circumstances in which it is necessary and desirable for the court to intervene. Perhaps the better view is that there is a spectrum upon which each case should be considered on its individual facts with courts being guided predominantly by considerations of fairness. The court's primary examination is whether on the facts there was sufficient indication of a failure on the part of the university to adhere to their published processes or that there was a lack of fairness or justice. The first consideration here relates to decisions of academic judgment. We will then move on to the judicial attitudes in relation to decisions involving academic misconduct.
'Of academic independence and other concerns' 3
Those 'purely academic' decisions at one end of the spectrum are those 'pertaining to the intimate life of every independent academic institution that, sensibly, courts decline to review'. 4 Examples include: the marking of exam papers, the academic merit of a thesis, the viability of a research project, the contents of courses, timetables and styles of teaching.
Universally, courts have shown a reluctance to revisit such decisions. However, the cases show that there may be a difficulty in deciding when that reluctance may properly be overcome and when the decision is justifiably subject to the court's scrutiny. Generally, the prevailing view has been that academic judgement should only attract judicial interference when it can be shown that there was a lack of adherence to due process or when the person or body responsible did not actually exercise professional judgement. Clearly when it is purely a question of academic assessment or academic judgement the student has no right to be present on the marking of examination papers. It may well be different if the evaluation of the student's progress or the question of exclusion of a student from the university involves questions other than mere academic judgment.
Douglas J agreed that the appeal should be dismissed and added the following remark 11 :
I want to say that this application is one which relies upon a failure by the appellant to accept that she did in fact fail two subjects in her course, one of which was a prerequisite to her continuing in that course. That, without more, is not sufficient to mount a successful application for relief. Norrie had applied for judicial review of a decision of the Faculty of Medicine. His application for enrolment for his final year as a medical student had been declined. While deciding that, in principle, a university decision may be subject to the scrutiny of the courts, Woodhouse P, speaking for the majority of the Court of Appeal said:
14 I have great difficulty in understanding why it should be thought that wherever the visitor is able to act the actual jurisdiction of the Courts has been ousted.
While he was careful to exclude matters of purely academic judgement from the court's jurisdiction, he clearly stated that in his view there was a compelling argument for the courts' scrutiny of some university decisions in light of the fact that they are bodies set up to promote a public purpose using public funds. The student's allegation of breach of contract by the college also failed, see below.
the basis of the judgement.
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R v Cambridge University ex parte Persaud, Persaud v Cambridge University
21 is one such case.
In 1993 Jennifer Persaud was admitted as a PhD student within the Institute of Astronomy at the University of Cambridge. Her research progression was intermittent and she was involved in a series of disagreements with successive supervisors. In 1997 the Director of the Institute formed the opinion that she should withdraw as her work was unlikely to reach the standard of a PhD thesis and he recommended this action to the Registrar of Graduate Students. Following submissions from Persaud it was decided that she could continue her
PhD under several conditions which were conveyed to her and she agreed to them. Things did not improve and in July 1998, after receiving an opinion from a 'senior academic in the field', the Board of Graduate Studies decided to remove her name from the register of Graduate Students. Although she had started work on a new research project with a new supervisor, she attempted to appeal the decision, requesting confirmation of what she referred to as the 'oral assurances' that she would be reinstated at the point she was ready to submit her thesis. The Institute declined on the basis that she had now embarked on a new, and entirely different, research project. Persaud requested copies of the reports which had led to the decision to discontinue her candidature but the university declined to make the reports available.
Persaud applied for judicial review of the decisions. Essentially her application was based on lack of fairness. At first instance, Maurice Kay J dismissed the application. fairly. However, the Supreme Court of Judicature Court of Appeal (Civil Division) decided that the university had acted unfairly and allowed the appeal in part. 22 In the judges' view it was a question of fact whether the Board was in breach of its duty to act fairly. The failure of the Board to consider Persaud's submissions, and to reject her account of events without first putting their doubts of its accuracy to her, was unfair. So also was the failure to make available to her the reports, particularly the report of the independent academic as it appeared to raise a new issue which was the potential value of her research. The statement of Chadwick LJ, delivering the opinion of the court 23 clearly enunciates the realistic attitude of the courts to such challenges and it is consistent with case law from the comparative jurisdictions.
This view prevails in Canada also, as is clear from the analysis of case law in the decision of Sinclair J of the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench in the case of Al-Bakkal v de Vries. 24 The judge granted an application for judicial review to a third-year dentistry student who had had marks deducted from her with the result that her grades were insufficient to enable her to progress to her fourth year of studies. The judge was satisfied that the student was a victim of a biased and unfair process of the Students Promotion Committee. 25 He was also satisfied that the Faculty Council and the Senate Appeal Committee took into account considerations which had not been raised to the student and that in any event those bodies were biased by unproven allegations of cheating on the part of the student (which the student was unaware of until the judicial review hearing). After reviewing previous decisions of the Canadian
22
The court allowed the appeal in that it quashed the Board's decisions but as the student was now engaged in substantially different research the court felt that an order of mandamus would be inappropriate and would serve no useful purpose. The internal university body which reports to the Faculty Council on whether a student is entitled to be promoted from one year to the next.
Courts, 26 he set out the following propositions which in his view governed the decision for the student. He said while it is the duty of the court to attribute a large measure of autonomy to the decisions of a tribunal such as the Board of Governors of a university, the tribunal must observe rules of natural justice or 'fair play in action'. Secondly, he said there was a necessity for a high standard of justice in such cases. The stakes were high as a suspension in such circumstances would have grave consequences for a person's right to pursue their profession or employment. Justice required the tribunal to listen fairly to both sides and to ensure that the party was given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict any statements which were prejudicial to them. 27 Importantly, the judge did not require that the Faculty reconsider the applicant's grade, rather he ordered declarations that the mark deduction which had rendered her a fail rather than a pass was reversed; that she had therefore passed her third year of dentistry and that she be admitted to her fourth year of studies.
The point on which all the above cases turn is not whether the academic judgement decision was fair but rather whether the process by which the decision was reached was fair.
What then of decisions involving discipline for academic misconduct?
The other end of the spectrum: academic disciplinary decisions -is the attitude different?
26
Houston v University of Saskatchewan (1994) should be deemed to have failed the entire set of examinations and that he should not be permitted to re-take them. The crucial medical evidence and testimonials, which had been before the Disciplinary Committee who had heard the matter first, had not been before the Board of Examiners, neither were the minutes of the Committee hearing. The applicant was not allowed to be present. The Court quashed the decision of the Board of Examiners on the basis that it had failed to take into account the full evidence in mitigation which had been placed before and accepted by the Disciplinary Committee at the original hearing. The judge said that it was incumbent upon the Board to take such material into account and failure to do so nullified the decision.
Natural justice also dictates that the disciplinary body conducting the hearing is impartial and that there is no real danger of bias. If a disciplinary allegation arises out of some direct contact The argument of bias was raised, also unsuccessfully, by another student in the United Kingdom, in R v Cambridge University ex parte Beg.
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The student had submitted an independent essay for a Master of Philosophy in Finance at the University of Cambridge.
One of the examiners made an allegation of plagiarism. At the hearing conducted by the court of discipline, Beg agreed that there was plagiarism in the marked essay but contended that it was not the essay submitted by him but there had been a substitution by Mr K, his supervisor. His internal appeal on the grounds of bias was unsuccessful and he applied for judicial review on the same grounds. One of his arguments was that he had been penalised because of the nature of his defence which involved an attack on the integrity of a lecturer at the university. He contended that there had been a breach of natural justice as guaranteed to him by Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
31
Sullivan J of the Queen's Bench Division dismissed the application, holding that there was no evidence of bias or lack of independence or impartiality on the part of the internal body.
The cases clearly illustrate that where a court is satisfied that natural justice has been properly observed the student will be hard-pushed to persuade it to overturn the decision. three maths and engineering students challenged the university's finding that they had committed acts of academic misconduct. The allegation, made by the subject convenors, was that the students, based on their examination answers and in relation to their past performances in the subjects, must have had access to the solutions paper for the exam. This view was supported by the fact that the students had reproduced in their answers minor errors in the solutions paper. The Academic Misconduct Committee of the Faculty of Science, Technology and Engineering found that the charges were proven and each student was given a zero grade for the examination and excluded from the university for a period of time. The appeal was heard and dismissed by the Reserve Proctorial Board. The students asked the Supreme Court to review the decisions. Bamford J was not concerned with whether his court had jurisdiction to grant review. Rather, he concentrated on whether the students' claims of lack of process and unfairness had been proven on the facts. He decided that they had not. He held that the Board had conducted the hearing in observance of the procedure provided in the regulations and there was no evidence of bias and no breach of principles of natural justice.
The judge found that the Board had acted fairly to all parties in the manner it dealt with the material and declined the students' application for review. Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was refused.
It is clear from all the above cases that thus far, in the comparative jurisdictions, judicial willingness to overturn academic decisions has been solely dependent upon whether, on the facts, the student has demonstrated unfairness or the potential for unfairness in the process.
There is no suggestion in the cases that the courts consider themselves unable to consider a student's application in public law for judicial review. shown that the relevant decision was 'a decision to which this Act applies'. 35 The University argued that the Review Act did not apply because the decisions were made pursuant to various university policies and so were neither of 'an administrative character' nor made 'under an enactment' as required by the judicial review legislation.
The questions of whether she would be entitled to a remedy under the common law or pursuant to the powers of the Supreme Court of Queensland, or otherwise, did not arise because she had relied solely on the statutory procedures and sought only the statutory remedies provided by the Review Act. Although a plea in contract may have been fatal to the application for judicial review, it would have given the court the opportunity to look at the nature of the student/university relationship and consider whether private law (contract) would have provided the appropriate relief in these circumstances.
48
Kirby J delivered a very strong dissenting judgment in Tang. He was particularly concerned that because of the way the proceedings had developed, no court had had the opportunity to examine the substance of the student's complaint. 49 In essence, her complaints were: that the Chair of the Board was not impartial as he was the person who had initially investigated the complaint against her; that she had been denied legal representation and adequate time to evaluate and respond to expert witnesses relied on by the university; that the university had breached its own policy and that the decisions were not based on relevant material and There is no mystery in the litigation strategy of the University. By seeking an order to dismiss the application it forestalled any examination by the courts of Tang's complaints.
49
Although Kirby J outlines Tang's complaints about the decisions, it is still unclear exactly why and how the Board came to hear the allegations of academic misconduct made against her. Who were the academics who made the initial complaint? To whom had she presented the allegedly false or but the majority had cut dead any chance of her doing so by holding that the Review Act did not apply. The matter had proceeded all the way to the High Court of Australia but her claims and any arguments on their merits had never been nor would they be tried. 51 In Kirby's view this result was 'surprising':
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Given her enrolment in the University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, the nature of the complaints that the respondent wished to ventilate, the public character of the University as a statutory authority substantially supported by public funds, the devastating consequences of the University 'decision' on the immediate and long-term career and reputation of the respondent and the language and purpose of the Review Act.
Kirby noted that the majority's narrow construction of the Review Act effectively left Australian university students without the means of judicial review -a right which they would normally have in other common law countries and did have in Australia until now. His view is compatible with the attitude expressed in previous cases elsewhere. Almost universally the attitude has been that it is imperative that students have recourse to the courts where it is demonstrated that irregularities in internal procedures give rise to a high possibility of their having led to an unjust result. Unfortunately, the strict adherence to statutory interpretation by the majority in Tang may serve to reinforce an academic immunity which is no longer enjoyed by other professions.
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But what of private law -does the student have rights in contract?
improperly obtained data? Had she submitted her PhD thesis for examination? Had she presented her work in progress at a research seminar? Had she submitted her work to her PhD supervisor? Had her supervisor instructed her of the appropriate ethical and scientific standards required for laboratory work? Many questions remain unanswered even after lengthy litigation. When Wade wrote in 1969 54 that the legal relationship of a university with its members was much more suitably governed by the ordinary law of contract and by ordinary contractual remedies much of the academic community was dumbfounded. Now, this proposition is beyond argument. 55 Acceptance of the student/institute contract highlights university regulations and documentation, such as university prospectuses, as central to the relationship.
In the New Zealand case of Grant, Woolley, Staines & Grant v Victoria University, Ellis J of the High Court put the existence of a university/student contract beyond doubt when he said:
56 I think it is beyond argument that the relationship between the student (who is a member of the university: s163) and the University is partly based on contract and partly based on the [Education] Act itself … it is therefore on the basis of contract, tort or judicial review that a student may seek redress against the University … The Court will not adjudicate on matters which impinge on academic freedom and independence, but they will entertain an action brought by a student based on tort or his or her contract with the University which does not so impinge.
In the UK case of Clark v The University of Lincolnshire & Humberside 57 the student argued breach of contract and the court supported the view that public law and private law rights are coexistent and not exclusive of each other. 58 For her final examination for a degree in humanities, Clark had chosen to do a paper and presentation on 'A Streetcar Named Desire'.
She did the work on computer and failed to keep a backup file. On the last day before the due date she lost all of the paper from the hard disk and instead submitted some notes copied from a commentary on the work. The examiner gave her a mark of zero, originally on the grounds of plagiarism though the university later abandoned this initial finding. The Academic Appeals Board accepted that she had not set out to deceive and sent the paper back to the Board of Examiners for re-marking. The Board marked it at zero and confirmed that they treated this as a failure and not a matter of plagiarism. Clark was allowed to resit her final and obtained an award of a third class degree which the student regulations provided was the usual award in such circumstances. She instituted a claim against the university in contract on the basis that the university was in breach of its contractual obligations by limiting the class of degree she could obtain on a second attempt. The university applied to have the proceedings struck out on the basis that the claim in contract was not justiciable. It argued that the relationship between a student and a university, as a public body, meant that a dispute was more properly covered in public law and to pursue a claim in contract was an abuse of process in that it circumvented the three month limitation period of judicial review. The Court of Appeal disagreed. It held that a student could have a claim in contract, even though the action could more appropriately be brought by judicial review proceedings. It said that the court would not strike out the claim merely because of the procedure which had been adopted.
Importantly, in light of the Australian High Court decision in Tang, the judges in Clark accepted without question the availability of judicial review in respect of university decisions.
Sedley LJ, delivering the opinion of the court saw the position as follows:
59
This is a matter of considerable importance in relation to litigation by dissatisfied students against universities. Grievances against universities are preferably resolved within the grievance procedure which universities have today … If it is not possible to resolve the dispute, then the courts may have no alternative but to become involved. If they do so, the preferable procedure would usually be by way of judicial review. If, on the other hand, the proceedings are based on the contract between the student and the university then they do not have to be brought by way of judicial review. The courts today will be flexible in their approach. 63 This was an action by students at an Oxfordshire FE College for breach of a contract to educate. They alleged that the course content which 'they legitimately expected to be substantial and good, was low and often poorly taught'. Following a finding that there had been a breach, the question then became: how were the students to be compensated? In such a situation, similar to the Victoria University case above, there are some losses which are quantifiable, such as course costs, loss of income and the like.
However, and this may be particularly so in the university cases, damages for anxiety and distress, and disappointment damages, are likely to be claimed. The general rule in contract is that damages relate to losses flowing from the breach and not to the circumstances surrounding the breach. They will not therefore usually be awarded for the mental suffering of the innocent party so caused. 64 The noted exception is where the object of the contract is to provide pleasure or that very state of mind which has been damaged. 65 A 'breach of contract to educate' situation, said the judge in Rycotewood, may provide another exception. It is a short stretch to suggest that a further exception may be in the case of an adverse academic decision where breach of contract on the part of the university is proven. Certainly in such a situation it is highly probable that a student may claim damages for the anxiety and distress caused by the wrongful actions of the university. 66 Likely too is a claim for damages for the disappointment caused by having been cut off from progression in a chosen career. Only time, as they say, will tell. an external and independent body to resolve student complaints. This body is set up in recognition of the imbalance which exists in the university/student relationship in terms of resources for litigation, and the difficulties faced by aggrieved students when they are unable to achieve satisfaction through the internal university procedures. Its aim is not to replace recourse to those internal procedures. Students must those procedures first before the matter will be taken up by the OIA. The OIA opened for business in March 2004 and 100 higher education institutions in England and Wales have voluntarily joined the scheme. It will be interesting to watch its progress with the aim of its providing a template for similar systems in Australia and New Zealand.
Conclusion -Where to academic immunity?
The courts have been progressively defining the parameters within which they will subject university decisions to their scrutiny. It is clear now is that there are no hard and fast rules of demarcation and that the courts will be prepared to consider a student's challenge not within categories but within the facts and circumstances of every case. Whether it is a decision of pure academic judgment or one of academic discipline the common denominator which dictates the extent to which the courts will intervene is fairness and adherence to process.
Thus the most important factor a student must demonstrate is not that the decision was flawed, but that the process by which it was made was flawed. 67 In making the decision the university body concerned must have observed natural justice in that it must not only have complied with the policies and procedures of the university but also it must not have allowed extraneous elements to bring influence to bear. It seems that this would be the case whether the student chooses to apply for judicial review of the decision or whether he or she opts for an action in breach of contract or both.
In the scheme of things however, the number of cases reaching the courts is small. Anecdotal evidence suggests substantially more aggrieved students are deterred by the obstacles from pursuing their cause. It is regrettable that the majority in the High Court of Australia in Tang approached the matter solely as one of interpretation of the judicial review legislation and missed the real point.
Elsewhere the focus is on the wider question: is there a weakening in the traditional reluctance of the courts to look behind decisions of academic judgement? Should this be so?
There are many who feel the answer should be yes. 68 The underlying questions are: why, unlike other professional groups, have academics remained largely immune from judicial interference and why have universities, unlike other publicly funded statutory institutions, remained relatively free from judicial review? Society's trend towards greater transparency and accountability, together with the increasing commodification of education, means that these questions will not go away.
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